Friday, June 5, 2009

Calling all rSO in Texas with Deferred Adjudication

If you are a Texas rSO, granted the lie of deferred adjudication leave a comment with an email address to get in touch with you. Comments will not be published (I can see them before anyone else). I would like to discuss if any of you are interested in helping with a lawsuit against the state for the recent changes about to become law in this state. This will be a John/Jane Doe filing.

Take a look at S.B. 689 for more details.

Direct Link

If any of you have been following the work of TAJLR and Rob Sandifer, you know that the Texas Legislature has time and again refused to honor their contract with any of us that were ignorant of the real reason they allow DA. Deferred Adjudication is not a conviction according to the law, however over the past 20 years, the State has exempted the DA that we were awarded from certain crimes that we accepted the 'bargain' against.

Recently TAJLR has done a good effort in trying to get a bill passed that would allow for a final expungement of DA's, however the Legislature first ripped the bill into shreds, and then they didn't pass what they had substituted. This along with several years of work from TAJLR has been poo'd on by our elected officials. It is time for them to understand that we are tired of the promises they made to us being broken. The only way to do this is to file a lawsuit.

For those of us that have called the Reps and state senators expressing our hope for more just legislation, you know how frustrating it is to be hung up on, or ignored by them. They cannot ignore a lawsuit.

For those of us that see everyday how the constant retroactive laws affects our family's well-being, we will show the legislature and all elected officials that we have had enough. Every day, each of us have seen our children harmed by these laws. How the government threatens our family unit and the mental upbringing of our children by passing their retroactive laws.

Everyday we see how they piss on the Constitution and the Bill of Rights, everyday we see more of the Rights to Life, Liberty, and the Pursuit of Happiness being stripped away from us. And everyday our families suffer for something we paid for years ago! Enough is Enough. It is time to make them listen, it is time to drag their asses into court and make them face their illegal behavior.

If you are serious in wanting to help plan this out, leave a message. I'll delete them after I get a contact list created, but will not actually publish them. I am going to do this, but really need the help.

If you are tired of the bullshit, or if you are worried about losing your job/home/family over more and more restrictive laws then please leave a message.

If you don't care, or believe you are not affected, then I understand you not wanting to get involved.

Either way that you decide understand that these laws are RETROACTIVE. What affects one affects all.

As a side note, You will notice they are going to have a meeting about what to do next. Their idea of a lawsuit has helped me make my decision as well, although I think they are gonna do a lawyer, and mine will be pro se. However, if you are on DA or have completed one I am sure these folks would like to see you in Austin.

Man gets 4 years for murder, but rSO's get life.

Ok I get it, the people of the world really believe that crimes that are defined as sex offenses are considered more heinous than pre-meditated murder. What I don't get is how these same people sleep at night knowing that you can murder someone and get a bare instance of time for it, when some 18 year old guy/gal gets 10 years in the pen and life on the registry for having sex with their 16 year old boyfriend/girlfriend. Call my crazy, but how again does that even out?

Link to the story here

(CNN) -- An Alabama man was sentenced to 4½ years in prison Friday for his wife's death during their honeymoon in Australia nearly six years ago.

David Gabriel Watson pleaded guilty to manslaughter in the October 2003 death of Tina Watson, an Australian court spokesman said.

Watson was 26 when she drowned while diving around the "Yongala" shipwreck, about 42 miles off the coast of Townsville.

Watson had told police that his wife appeared to panic 45 feet underwater and drowned accidentally. However, authorities found inconsistencies in his account.

As evidence of a motive, investigators cited her father's statement that Watson had asked her to maximize her life insurance and make him the beneficiary shortly before their wedding.

The insurance company confirmed that Watson asked about her policy after her death, investigators said.

Townsville Coroner David Glasgow noted in his inquest findings that David was an experienced diver while his wife was a novice.

The couple married in Birmingham, Alabama, and left for Australia two days later


The Price of over criminalization

So they over criminalize everything, they lock MILLIONS up, some of which are known or proven innocent every year and now they want to slowly starve them to death. hmm.. So if the prison system is no longer serving breakfast or lunch, can the men and women stay in their cells instead of going to court mandated reeducation classes? I think they should be able to. Seriously, how in the hell can you expect someone to follow prison rules if you starve them? I understand that the prison states they will receive enough calories, but you can add extra sugar, or bread to the menu and they will get calories.

Welcome to America folks, we take our prison system rules direct from the Soviet Gulag playbook.

ATLANTA -- The recession is hitting home for inmates, too: Some cash-strapped states are taking aim at prison menus.

Georgia prisoners already didn't get lunch on the weekends, and the Department of Corrections recently eliminated the midday meal on Fridays, too. Ohio may drop weekend breakfasts and offer brunch instead. Other states are cutting back on milk and fresh fruit.

Officials say prisoners are still getting enough calories, but family members and critics say the changes could make prisoners irritable and food a valuable commodity, increasing the possibility of violence.

In Georgia, inmates are still getting the same number of daily calories: 2,800 for men and 2,300 for women. The portions at breakfast and dinner are bigger on days only two meals are served.

Almost 5 percent of the state's 58,295 prisoners still get three meals every day because they are diabetic, pregnant or have other special health needs.

Barbara Helie, whose 25-year-old son Nicholas is serving time for armed robbery in Valdosta State Prison, said he would go hungry without the roughly $60 a week she puts into his account to buy instant soups, cheese, beef sticks and other snacks at the prison commissary.

"I don't know how the guys who don't have someone on the outside helping out handle it," Helie said. "Food has been an ongoing issue for him ... He's hungry a lot."

Georgia's fast-growing prison system -- the fifth-largest in the nation -- has been hit hard by the same budget woes plaguing other states. For the current fiscal year, the state has slashed almost 10 percent from the state Department of Corrections' $1.1 billion budget.

Friday lunches were a casualty of the department's decision to save money on gas and other costs by scaling back the prisoner work week from five eight-hour days to four 10-hour days, said Calvin Brown, Georgia Department of Corrections Deputy Director of Facility Operations. He couldn't say how much the state is saving.

For years now, Georgia prisoners have received only two meals a day on weekends because they don't work, so now the same holds true on Fridays. They get three meals on work days because they are exerting themselves on road crews and litter pick up.

There are no federal minimum caloric standards for state prison systems, though they are encouraged to adhere to guidelines established by the Institute of Medicine of the National Academies Food and Nutrition Board. Georgia officials say they follow those guidelines, and Brown said there have been some complaints from inmates and family members but no lawsuits.

In Ohio, prisons director Terry Collins said eliminating breakfast on the weekends and replacing it with brunch "could save us some real dollars when it comes to staffing and food costs."

He said the move would not upset prisoners because it would not sacrifice quality.

"I don't expect them to be as good as mom's home cooking, but the food should be cooked and presented properly," Collins said.

Other states have kept three meals but are scaling back menus. Earlier this month, Alabama reduced the milk and fresh fruit it serves to save $700,000. Alabama inmates now receive an apple or an orange once a week, down from twice a week. Milk has been reduced from seven servings per week to three. Tennessee has also cut back on milk portions for men -- from two servings a day to one -- to save $600,000.

Gordon Crews, a professor at Marshall University in West Virginia, wrote a book looking at correctional violence and said historically there have been links between food and problems behind bars. He pointed to a February riot at the Reeves County Detention Center in Texas caused in part by poor food quality.

"A lot of prisoners will see something like that as some kind of retribution against them or some kind of mistreatment," Crews said. "It'll be something that the correctional staff will pay the price for ... another reason (for inmates) to argue and fight back."

In Georgia, reports of inmate assaults -- on both staff and other inmates -- are up substantially for fiscal year 2009 over the year before, according to data obtained by The Associated Press through an open records request.

Prison officials deny the increase has anything to do with the shrinking menu but didn't provide an explanation.

Sara Totonchi, of the Southern Center for Human Rights, called the elimination of Friday lunch part of a troubling trend of budget cuts in Georgia's correctional system.

"We don't think this is a good idea," she said. "It destabilizes things inside the prison and that is not good for any of the inmates or staff."


Child found in concrete block

What a terrible thing this is. Although they have not identified the body 100%, it is still the body of a child and should be mourned. The problem here is that media and the ignorant people are immediately going after the rSO boyfriend. Ok granted, he has the background for it and thus should be a suspect. However sordid his past maybe though, the real suspect needs to be the mother. I think it will be very interesting when they begin to dig harder into her background and I can only hope they find the whole truth as to her involvement.



DETROIT -- A body discovered in the River Raisin Thursday is believed to be that of a missing 5-year-old Monroe girl.

Nevaeh Buchanan was last seen May 24 in the parking lot of an apartment complex about 35 miles south-southwest of Detroit.

Body Found In River Raison
Timeline: Missing Monroe Girl

Community Reacts To Body Found

Her mother, Jennifer Buchanan, told Local 4 that the Monroe County Sheriff's Department informed her late Thursday evening that they believe the body is her daughter.

Ryan Bickley, 15, told Local 4 that his father, Guy Bickley, and grandfather, Lowell Kirk, were fishing on the river near Ida Maybee Road and spotted a block of poured cement and noticed a bad smell.

At first they said they didn't think much about it. After about 2 hours, Bickley said he kicked the concrete and noticed something.

Bickley said he chipped away a piece of the cement, revealing what appeared to be human skin.

"He called me, and he was hysterical," Ryan Bickley said. "He saw flies around it and that it was starting to crack, and when he bent down the smell got really bad."

Bickley said his father quickly backed away and called police.

The discovery site is about 12 miles from the Charlotte Arms Apartment, where her mother said she was outside playing with a friend when she disappeared.

The sheriff's office will hold a 10:30 a.m. press conference Friday to reveal more details.

The community held a vigil on Thursday.

"I'm not giving up yet. I'm not giving up unless I see the body myself. I am not giving up hope yet because I still feel that she is near me," said Nevaeh's grandmother, Sherry Buchanan.

A local pastor held a small memorial service for Nevaeh bringing the crowd to prayers.

"We know Nevaeh is in heaven now. Nevaeh is in heaven with Jesus right now. Beyond a shadow of a doubt. We know there is no pain right now, no sorrow, only joy."

Friends of Nevaeh also spoke tearfully.

"My son is a total tragic mess because of this. He has missed her every single day she has been gone and now he is going to miss her for the rest of his life."

"It could happen to anybody and we hope it don't happen to anybody else," said Nevaeh's cousin, Shawn Lawson.

There have been no arrests in the case.

Wednesday, June 3, 2009

Everyone is writing, but noone is doing anything about it.

Interesting writing showcasing the despicable level that we have sunk to as Citizens and members of the human race.



May 09, 2009 /24-7PressRelease/ -- Problems With the Texas Sex Offender Registry

Article provided by Patrick L. Hancock
Visit us at www.hancockcriminaldefense.com

Discretion is the hallmark of the criminal justice system in Texas. The laws are written clearly, but the decisions are left to people. Juries are empowered to examine the facts of cases and make responsible decisions regarding guilt and innocence. Judges are trusted to maintain decorum and uphold the laws so that justice can prevail. At all times, participants within the court system are expected to handle difficult and sensitive matters in the interests of fairness and justice.

The Sex Offender Registration Program is the exception to this general principle. Unlike most areas of the criminal justice system, judges are given no discretion whatsoever. Under Texas law, when a person is convicted of a qualifying sex offense he or she is automatically and permanently required to register as a sex offender.

The laws providing for mandatory lifelong sex offender registration are ineffective. For the justice system to live up to its name, judges should be given discretion over the terms of registration.

Texas Sex Offender Registration Laws

Under the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure, anyone who is convicted of a sexual offense is required to register with local law enforcement as part of the Sex Offender Registration Program. Depending on the particular crime, the offender must register for 10 years, or for his or her entire lifetime.

The duration of the registration requirement depends entirely upon the crime; once a person is convicted, a judge has absolutely no discretion. The judge cannot decide that the registration period should be limited or that registration is inappropriate under the circumstances. The required registration period is mandated by the relevant statutes.

The Problem With Eliminating Discretion: No Two Cases Are the Same

Some may argue that the lack of discretion leads to equitable treatment; one person convicted of possessing child pornography should be treated the same as any other person convicted of possessing of child pornography. However, in criminal matters the circumstances are always important. No two cases are identical and removing a judge's discretion does not lead to equitable treatment.

For example, consider the case of a 16-year-old and an 18-year-old who are engaged in a consensual sexual relationship. Despite the laws, such relationships are undoubtedly common and rarely draw the attention of Texas courts. However, in the event that the relationship turns sour or results in pregnancy, the 16-year-old may report the encounters as nonconsensual.

In accordance with Texas law, the 18-year-old could be prosecuted for indecency with a child. Indecency with a child is an offense requiring registration; if convicted, the older partner would be required to register for life.

This hypothetical is not intended to undermine the very real threat of sex offense or to suggest that all accusations are false. However, by leaving the judges without any discretion in sentencing, people who truly pose no threat are classified and publicly ostracized with those who are legitimately dangerous. Lifetime registration as a sex offender is a tremendous burden to place on someone for a mistake made at age 18 in a consensual relationship.

An Overinclusive Registry Undermines the Intent of Notification

Furthermore, including this hypothetical 18-year-old ultimately undermines the registry. One of the primary purposes of a sex offender registry is to alert the public to local people who are potentially dangerous. When people who are not truly threatening are included in this database, the registry is overinclusive and becomes less valuable.

If judges had discretion, they could examine the individual circumstances and determine whether a particular offender is likely to commit another offense in the future. Accordingly, the registry could be limited to those who truly threaten others and therefore warrant inclusion.

Alternately, the judge could consider the circumstances and determine whether a shorter registration period might be sufficient, rather than the current lifetime registration requirement. Again, this would alert the public to people who had recently committed sex offenses without including those who haven't committed crimes for decades.

Unfortunately, judges in Texas are not currently given this type of decision making authority; they are beholden to unbending laws. As a result, it is extremely important that anyone accused of any type of sex offense in Texas take these accusations seriously and consult with an experienced criminal defense attorney. A knowledgeable lawyer cannot change the laws, but can take actions to minimize the potential consequences of any accusation.





Find the original here




Can someone of law-minded thought pick this apart?

This was decided in 2002, but an interesting take on things. Pick it apart and tell me what you think the decision could affect.



IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS

OF TEXAS




NO. 006-03


THE STATE OF TEXAS


v.



WILLIAM OWEN JUVRUD, Appellee

Womack, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.



The question in this case is whether Section 20 of Article 42.12 of the Code of Criminal Procedure mandates that a defendant on deferred-adjudication community supervision must complete "one-third of the original community supervision period or two years of community supervision, whichever is less," or whether Section 5(c) of Article 42.12 permits a trial court to terminate a defendant's deferred-adjudication community supervision at any time.

After William Owen Juvrud, the appellee, pleaded guilty to one count of misapplication of fiduciary property, (1) the trial court, pursuant to a plea bargain between Juvrud and the State, deferred-adjudication of Juvrud's guilt and placed him on community supervision for 10 years. Approximately four months later, Juvrud filed a motion to dismiss and discharge his community supervision. The trial court granted Juvrud's motion, discharged him from community supervision, and dismissed the indictment against him.

On appeal, the State argued that "the trial court lacked the authority to discharge Juvrud's community supervision and dismiss the indictment before he had satisfactorily completed two years of community supervision as required by Article 42.12, [S]ection 20." Juvrud responded that the trial court discharged him pursuant to Section 5(c) of Article 42.12, which does not impose any minimum length of time for community supervision. The Eighth Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of the trial court. By reference to the legislative history of the sections, the Court of Appeals concluded that Section 20 applies only to regular (also known as "straight") community supervision, while Section 5(c) governs the early termination of deferred-adjudication. Because Section 5 provides no minimum term which must be served before a defendant is eligible for early termination, the Court of Appeals held that the trial court had authority to terminate Juvrud's community supervision. State v. Juvrud, 96 S.W.3d 550 (Tex. App. --El Paso 2002, pet. granted).

We granted review. We agree with the Court of Appeals that the trial court had authority to terminate Juvrud's community supervision under Article 42.12, Section 5(c).

Article 42.12

Article 42.12 defines community supervision as the "placement of a defendant by a court under a continuum of programs and sanctions, with conditions imposed by the court for a specified period during which (A) criminal proceedings are deferred without an adjudication of guilt; or (B) a sentence of imprisonment or confinement, imprisonment and fine, or confinement and fine, is probated and the imposition of sentence is suspended in whole or in part." (2) The Code of Criminal Procedure provides several specific forms of community supervision for various circumstances and offenses--such as regular or straight, deferred-adjudication, shock, boot camp, and state jail felony. (3) Each type of community supervision has its own limitations and requirements. As a Court of Appeals held, in an opinion by a retired Presiding Judge of this Court, the special provisions for deferred-adjudication in Section 5 prevail over provisions for regular probation in Section 3, the general definition of "community supervision" in Section 2(2) notwithstanding. See Rodriguez v. State, 939 S.W.2d 211, 220-21 (Tex. App.--Austin 1997, no pet.) (Onion,J).

Here, Juvrud was placed on deferred-adjudication community supervision pursuant to Article 42.12, Section 5(a). The rules and requirements of deferred-adjudication community supervision are distinct and separate from those applying to other types of community supervision. (4)

Section 5

Section 5 of Article 41.12 addresses deferred-adjudication community supervision. Not only does it provides for the availability of deferred-adjudication, but it also sets out the requirements, restrictions, and procedures concerning deferred-adjudication. Section 5 addresses no other types of community supervision.

Section 5(a) provides the procedures for placing a defendant on deferred-adjudication. It also limits the maximum time a defendant can be placed on deferred-adjudication for a felony and misdemeanor case. There is no minimum term of supervision except in the case of a defendant charged with a felony under specific enumerated sections of the Texas Penal Code. A trial court may, however, increase the maximum period of community supervision by following the procedures set out in Sections 22(c) or 22A. Section 5(b) provides the procedures for violation of a condition of deferred-adjudication supervision imposed under Section (a).

Section 5(c), the section at issue in this case, provides the requirements regarding the expiration of deferred-adjudication community supervision. Under this section, "[t]he judge may dismiss the proceedings and discharge a defendant, other than a defendant charged with an offense requiring the defendant to register as a sex offender . . . prior to the expiration of the term of community supervision if in the judge's opinion the best interest of society and the defendant will be served." Under this section, a dismissal and discharge "may not be deemed a conviction for the purposes of disqualifications or disabilities imposed by law for conviction of an offense," although the fact that a defendant had received deferred-adjudication may be considered by a judge or jury (in the punishment stage of a subsequent criminal conviction), by a state agency (if the defendant is an applicant for a license or is a licensee under Human Resources Code, Chapter 42), or by the Interagency Council on Sex Offender Treatment (if the defendant is a person who has applied for registration to provide mental health or medical services for the rehabilitation of sex offenders). Finally, Section 5(d) provides the limitations on a trial court's grating of deferred-adjudication, and Section 5(e) deals with the confidentiality of deferred-adjudication.

When necessary, Section 5 references other sections of Article 42.12. For example, Section 5(a) provides that "a judge may increase the maximum period of community supervision in the manner provided by Section 22(c) or 22A of this article." However, in regard to dismissing and discharging a defendant prior to the expiration of the term of community service, there is no reference to Section 20, or to any other section of Article 41.12.



Section 20

Section 20 provides the guidelines for the reduction or termination of community supervision. Although its title, "Reduction or Termination of Community Supervision," refers generally to "community supervision," the definition of which includes deferred-adjudication, its language indicates that Section 20 can apply only to the types of community supervision that follow a conviction and sentence.

Under this section, "[a]t any time, after the defendant has satisfactorily completed one-third of the original community supervision period or two years of community supervision, whichever is less, the period of community supervision may be reduced or terminated by the judge." After community supervision is successfully completed, "the judge, by order duly entered, shall amend or modify the original sentence imposed, if necessary, to conform to the community supervision period and shall discharge the defendant. If the judge discharges the defendant the judge may set aside the verdict or permit the defendant to withdraw his plea and shall dismiss the accusation, complaint, information, or indictment against the defendant, who shall thereafter be released from all penalties resulting from the offense." However, should the defendant again be convicted of another criminal offense, "proof of the prior conviction or plea of guilty shall be made known to the judge."

From its language, Section 20 concerns defendants placed on community supervision after they were convicted. Among the types of community supervision--regular, shock, boot camp, state jail, deferred-adjudication--all but deferred-adjudication require a conviction first. For example, Section 15 provides for procedures relating to state-jail-felony community supervision. It provides that "on conviction of a state jail felony punished under [S]ection 12.35(a), Penal Code, the judge may suspend the imposition of sentence and place the defendant on community supervision or may order the sentence to be executed." Thus, there is no mention of conviction in Section 5 which deals with deferred-adjudication. However, under Section 20, a judge can amend or modify the sentence (not present under deferred-adjudication), set aside the verdict (not present under deferred-adjudication), and must be made aware that the defendant had a prior conviction or guilty plea, should the defendant again be convicted (not present under deferred-adjudication because the initial grant of community supervision is not deemed a conviction).

Section 20 also grants the judge authority to set aside the verdict: "if the judge discharges the defendant under this section, the judge may set aside the verdict or permit the defendant to withdraw his plea, and shall dismiss the accusation, complaint, information or indictment against the defendant. . ." Under Section 5, the judge has no such discretion; the judge must dismiss the proceedings against a defendant when the judge discharges the defendant from deferred-adjudication. More important is the reference to "under this section." Section 5(c) and Section 20 each refer to a dismissal and discharge "under this section." This provides support for the conclusion that these are separate and distinct early-termination procedures and the legislature, in creating these two distinct termination sections, made them such. If the legislature had intended for Section 20's procedures for early termination to apply to Section 5(c) and deferred-adjudication, it could have done so--either by eliminating the "under this section" restricting language or by referencing one section in the other.

While the title of Section 20 may be misleading, a close reading of the article demonstrates that Section 20 and its procedures for terminating community supervision do not apply to a defendant placed on deferred-adjudication community supervision. Rather, Section 5(c) controls deferred-adjudication community supervision and requires no minimum term of supervision that must be served before early dismissal.

Conclusion

Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals.





Tuesday, June 2, 2009

Conflicting Statutes


(c) On expiration of a community supervision period imposed under Subsection (a) of this section, if the judge has not proceeded to adjudication of guilt, the judge shall dismiss the proceedings against the defendant and discharge him. The judge may dismiss the proceedings and discharge a defendant, other than a defendant charged with an offense requiring the defendant to register as a sex offender under Chapter 62, as added by Chapter 668, Acts of the 75th Legislature, Regular Session, 1997, prior to the expiration of the term of community supervision if in the judge's opinion the best interest of society and the defendant will be served. The judge may not dismiss the proceedings and discharge a defendant charged with an offense requiring the defendant to register under Chapter 62, as added by Chapter 668, Acts of the 75th Legislature, Regular Session, 1997. Except as provided by Section 12.42(g), Penal Code, a dismissal and discharge under this section may not be deemed a conviction for the purposes of disqualifications or disabilities imposed by law for conviction of an offense. For any defendant who receives a dismissal and discharge under this section:


This is what is supposed to happen if someone in Texas completes deferred adjudication successfully. However if you read Article 62.005, you will see that they added the bit in about Deferred Adjudication:

(5) "Reportable conviction or adjudication" means a conviction or adjudication, including an adjudication of delinquent conduct or a deferred adjudication, that, regardless of the pendency of an appeal, is a conviction for or an adjudication for or based on:


So If one law is saying ONE thing, and another law says the exact opposite, what is the remedy?

Any f you lawyer minded folks out there care to push out a real world explanation?

Monday, June 1, 2009

Rights

Here is something I found very interesting.  The source it seems is from a student?!? at MIT, link included at the bottom.  IT seems to be an opinion of the individual, but a good thought process.



What is Punishment: Any discrimination is a punishment since the person is punished for having the property being discriminated on, except that discrimination by private people (who have no special authority) that does not abridge fundamental rights does not qualify as a punishment. Thus, remedies in civil cases, administrative actions, and punishment of children by the parents are examples of punishments.



Fundamental Rights

The Right to Travel

Here is an interesting article (date unknown) about an American's Right to travel.  Take a look at the excerpt and the linked article and tell me if any of you have updated information.


For years professionals within the criminal justice system have acted on the belief that traveling by motor vehicle was a privilege that was given to a citizen only after approval by their state government in the form of a permit or license to drive. In other words, the individual must be granted the privilege before his use of the state highways was considered legal. Legislators, police officers, and court officials are becoming aware that there are court decisions that disprove the belief that driving is a privilege and therefore requires government approval in the form of a license. Presented here are some of these cases:

CASE #1: "The use of the highway for the purpose of travel and transportation is not a mere privilege, but a common fundamental right of which the public and individuals cannot rightfully be deprived." Chicago Motor Coach v. Chicago, 169 NE 221.
CASE #2: "The right of the citizen to travel upon the public highways and to transport his property thereon, either by carriage or by automobile, is not a mere privilege which a city may prohibit or permit at will, but a common law right which he has under the right to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness." Thompson v. Smith, 154 SE 579.

It could not be stated more directly or conclusively that citizens of the states have a common law right to travel, without approval or restriction (license), and that this right is protected under the U.S Constitution.

CASE #3: "The right to travel is a part of the liberty of which the citizen cannot be deprived without due process of law under the Fifth Amendment." Kent v. Dulles, 357 US 116, 125.
CASE #4: "The right to travel is a well-established common right that does not owe its existence to the federal government. It is recognized by the courts as a natural right." Schactman v. Dulles 96 App DC 287, 225 F2d 938, at 941.





Right2Travel


I also found this on another site.  A finding by the courts regarding freedom of travel as a fundamental right.

 


To repeat, we deal here with a constitutional right of the citizen, a right which we must assume Congress will be faithful to respect. We would be faced with important constitutional questions were we to hold that Congress, by § 1185 and § 211a, had given the Secretary authority to withhold passports to citizens because of their beliefs or associations. Congress has made no such provision in explicit terms, and, absent one, the Secretary may not employ that standard to restrict the citizens' right of free movement.




Courts Opinion on Travel